PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

As

MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.

AFFINITY.

The Supreme Court of Alabama decides in Tagert v.
State, 39 S. 293, that under the State Criminal Code, which
defines incest as the intermarriage of or sexual

intercourse between persons within the degrees
of consanguinity or relationship within which
ceasedewfe
marriages are declared by law to be incestuous,
and void, with knowledge of such consanguinity or relationship, and the Civil Code which provides that "no man shall
marry the daughter of his wife," marriage or sexual intercourse between a man and the daughter of his deceased wife
is incestuous where there is living issue of the marriage,
which, it is held, continues the affinity between the husband
Husband and

Daughter of De-

and the wife's blood relations.
monwealth, IO Grat. 690.

Compare Jacques v. Com-

AGENCY.

In McClung v. McPherson, 82 Pac. 13, the Supreme
Court of Oregon decides that failure of a tenant to object
Evldence of

to the introduction in evidence of a notice to

quit signed by his landlord's attorneys, concedes
the attorneys' authority to sign the notice but does not admit
the sufficiency of the notice, which it is the province of the
court to determine. Compare Lowe v. Bliss, 24 Ill. 168.
Authority

APPEALS.

In State ex rel. Case v. Lyons, 39 S. 214, the Supreme
29
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Court of Alabama decides that where, pending an appeal
from a judgment denying a petition for manDismiss,
damus to compel the restoration of relator to
an office from which he was illegally removed, he was legally
removed, the appeal will be dismissed. Compare California
v. San Pablo etc. R. R., 149 U. S. 3o8.

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.
In Goodin v. Hays, 88 S. W. IIOI, the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky holds that where an attorney under contract for
employment is discharged without cause, he is
C,-pensation entitled to recover for the services rendered at
the contract price, abated by such sum as reasonably represents the unperformed part of the services; and where he
is discharged for cause he can only recover a reasonable
compensation for his services, without regard to the contract price. Compare Henry v. Vance, i i i Ky. 72.

BANKRUPTCY.
The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit,
decides In re Habegger, 139 Fed. 623, that the kind of legal
services to be performed for which an insolvent
Legalservlce debtor contemplating bankruptcy proceedings
may contract and make payment for in money or by a transfer of property, under the provisions of section 6od of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, are such services as are rendered
in aid of the purpose sought to be accomplished by the
act, conserve and benefit the estate of the bankrupt, and thus
inure to the benefit of the creditors, or are such legal services
as are contemplated by the act in bringing the bankrupt
estate before the court, its subsequent administration and
distribution to the creditors, and the like. Compare Randolph v. Scruggs, 190 U. S. 533.
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BANKRUPTCY (Continued).

The power of the Bankruptcy Court in dealing with the
estate of a corporation is illustrated In re Remington Automobile & Motor Co., 139 Fed. 766, where the
Assessment for United States District Court (N. D. New York)
Unpaid Stock
Subscriptions decides that an agreement between a corporation and a person to whom it issues stock that
only a certain per cent. of its par value shall be paid therefor,
and that no more shall be called for or paid, is in fraud of
creditors of the corporation, and may be set aside, and an
assessment made upon the holders of the stock for the difference between the amount paid and its par value by a court
of bankruptcy on application by the trustee in bankruptcy
of the corporation. Compare Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S.
at page 427.
BILLS AND NOTES.

'The Supreme Court of Tennessee decides in Farmers' &
Merchants' Bank v. Bank of Rutherford, 88 S. W. 939, that
Negligence of a bank on which a forged cheque is drawn in the
Drawee
name of a customer, whose signature is well
known to it, is negligent, where the cashier does not examine
the signature closely, but passes the cheque, relying on previous indorsements. The Court further holds that an
indorser of negotiable paper, does not warrant to the drawee
the genuineness of the maker's signature, but such warranty only extends to subsequent holders in due course of
trade. Compare People's Bank v. Franklin Bank, 88 Tenn.
299.
CARRIERS.

The Supreme Court of Alabama decides in Stafsky v.
Southern Ry. Co., 39 Southern, 132, that where a buyer,
Conversion: to whom goods are consigned, wrongfully
Re-shipment refuses to receive them on their arrival within
a reasonable time, the seller is authorized to rescind the sale,
and the carrier is not guilty of conversion in complying with
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the seller's orders to ship the goods back to him. It is further

held that where a carrier tenders goods to the consignee, and
the latter denies ownership or obligation to receive the same,
and the carrier, in reliance on such denial, returns the goods,
to the shipper, on the latter's orders, the consignee is
estopped to sue the carder for conversion. With this decision compare Bacharach v. Chester Freight Line, 133 Pa.,
414.

It is held by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in
Vaughn v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 61 At. 695,
Termination of that where a carrier permits the consignee of
iability
merchandise to open the cars containing the same
after they have been placed on a spur track near the consignee's warehouse, and to remove part of the contents
thereof, and exercise and retain dominion over the same,
and puts his own locks on the cars, the carrier's liability,
as such, for the merchandise in the cars, is terminated. It
is further decided that where the consignee of merchandise
has accepted such a delivery thereof, and sold and removed
some of the goods, the fact that some merchandise still
remains in the carrier's cars for the convenience of the
consignee does not impose any liability as warehouseman on
the carder. Compare Richardson v. Goddard,23 HOW. 28.
The question of the extent to which a person owning a
building is responsible for the safety of persons using an
Who Are
elevator operated therein occurs not infrequently
in present-day cases. A new consideration of this matter
appears in Edwards v. Manufacturers' Bldg. Co., 61 Atl.
646, where the Supreme Court of Rhode Island decides that
a landlord who maintains an elevator in his private building for the use of tenants and their employees and customers
is not a common carrier, nor bound to the same degree of
care as that imposed upon a common carder, but is bound
only to exercise reasonable care for the safety of those who
enter upon his premises and use the elevator. Compare
Griffen v. Manice, 166 N. Y. 197.

PROGRESS OF THE LAW

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

The Court of Appeal, Third District of California, decides
in Ex parte Finley, 81 Pac. lO41, that a provision of the
code that every person under life sentence in a
Equal Protec-State prison, who with malice aforethought
tion el th L~Watepiww
i±m~c
commits an assault on the
person of another with
a deadly weapon or instrument, or by means of force likely
to produce great bodily injury, is punishable with death, is
not unconstitutional, as inflicting cruel and unusual punishment, or as depriving such convict of life or liberty without due process of law or as depriving him of the equal
protection of the laws. See also State v. Lewin, 37 Pac. 169.
In Gould v. Gould, 61 Ati. 6o4, the Supreme Court of
Errors of Connecticut decides that a law forbidding marriage by an epileptic while the woman is under
Marriage:
the age of forty-five years is constitutional
Epileptics
The case presents a very elaborate and interesting discussion of the questions involved.' It is further
decided in this connection that where one was induced by
fraudulent concealment to marry an epileptic, such marriage
being forbidden by statute, the person so deceived is entitled
to a divorce on the ground of fraudulent contract. Compare Bissell v. Davison, 65 Conn. 183, 29 L. R. A. 251.
In People ex rel. Bolt v. Society for Prevention of Cruelty
to Children, 95 N. Y. Supp. 250, the New York Supreme
Deprivationot Court (Special Term, New York County)
Liberty
decides that a child on whom an assault has
been committed is not, when committed to the custody of
a charitable institution as a witness against the assailant,
under the Penal Code, deprived of his constitutional liberty.
He is not, the court says, within the meaning of the constitutional provision, deprived of his liberty at all, but rather
for his own welfare is intrusted temporarily to the care and
custody of a society organized for such 'kindred purposes
and recognized as a state agency.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Continued).

A very interesting and important decision of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in reference to local legislation appears in Sample v. Pittsburg,212 Pa. 533, where
Local
Legislation it is decided that the Act of April 2o, 1905, P. L.
221, providing that where two cities are contiguous, and in
the same county, the smaller may be annexed to the larger,
prescribing the method of proceeding and the effect of
annexation; providing for the division of such enlarged
cities into wards, for the apportionment of common council,
and for the indebtedness of such cities, violates Article III,
section 7, subdivision 2, of the State Constitution, which
provides that the general assembly "shall not pass any local
or special law regulating the affairs of counties, cities, townships, wards, borough or school districts," inasmuch as the
only two cities in the Commonwealth that "are contiguous
and in the same county," are the cities of Pittsburg and Allegheny, and the clear intent of the act is to legislate locally
for them alone. In determining that the act is unconstitutional it is said that the court will consider as without merit
the contention that some time in the future there may be
two cities which may become contiguous and in that event
can be consolidated under the provisions of the act. Mr.
Justice Potter dissents. Compare Commonwealth v. Patton,
88 Pa. 258.

CONTRACTS.

The Supreme Court of Washington decides in United
States to Use of Standard Furniture Co. v. Hennisingsen,
Government 82 Pac. 171, that an act which requires the
Work:
bond of a contractor for government work
Bonds of Contractor
to be conditioned that he will make payment to all persons supplying him
in the prosecution of the work, does
relief afforded by the foreclosure of a
building erected for a private owner,
furnishing materials in the prosecution

labor and material
not merely give the
mechanics' lien on a
but protects persons
of the work, though
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CONTRACTS (Continued).

they do not become a part of the permanent structure. Compare American Surety Co. v. Lawrenceville Cement Co., I IO
Fed. 719.
CORPORATIONS.

In Hastings Lumber Co. v. Edwards, 75 N. E. 57, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decides that a
Cancelling by-law of a corporation providing that the direcSubscriptions tors shall have general supervision and control
of the business of the corporation and full power to take all
such steps as shall be for its best interest, and may issue and
dispose of such part of the treasury stock as they deem for
its best interest, does not empower the directors, at request
of a subscriber, to convert shares for which he had subscribed, but which he did not wish to take and pay for, into
such stock, and thus relieve him from his subscription.
Compare Penobscot & Kennebec R. R. Co. v. Dunn., 39
N. E. 587.
CRIMINAL LAW.

In State v. Call, 6I Atl. 833, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine decides that a plea of guilty in-court
Evience
is a confession of the crime charged in the complaint or indictment, and may be shown by oral testimony.
It is not necessary to show it by record.
DAMAGES.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decides in Carpenter v. Lancaster, Appellant, 212 Pa. 581, that if an injury
Sewers: resulting from the pollution of a stream by a
Munlcipalities municipality sewer system is permanent, the
land owner is to be compensated for the diminished value
of his land. In an action to recover such damages, it is said
that, it is immaterial that the city has or has not the right to
appropriate private property as part of its sewer system; and
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DAMAGES (Continued).

the carelessness and negligence of the city in doing the work
are also immaterial as they are not involved in determining
the damages resulting from the use of the stream.
DEEDS.

The Supreme Court of Washington holds in Chapman v.
Tyson, 81 Pac. io66, that where a father purchased lands
with his own funds for himself, but used the
Use of
Assumed Name name of his infant son in the transaction, falsely
representing such name to be his own name, a conveyance
made by him under the assumed name passed title to his
grantee, and could not be successfully attacked as a forgery.
Compare Queen v. Martin, 5 Q. B. D. 34.

DURESS.

The City Court of New York, Trial Term, decides in
Fuerst v. Musical Mut. Protective Union, 95 N. Y. Supp.
155, that a threat made by the officers of a union
What
Constitutes: of musicians that, unless a member paid an illePayment

gal fine imposed he would be expelled, causing

the member to fear that, unless he paid the fine, he would be
expelled and deprived of his means of earning a living,
amounts to duress, entitling him to maintain an action for
the fine paid.
EMINENT DOMAIN.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine decides in Brown
v. Gerald, 61 Atl. 785, that a public use, such as justifies
the taking of private property against the will
Publi Use of the owner, cannot rest merely upon public
benefit, or public interest, or great public utility. It implies
a possession, occupation and enjoyment of the property taken
by the public at large, or by public agencies. That only can
be considered a public use where the government is supply-
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EMINENT DOMAIN (Continued).
ing its own needs, or is furnishing facilities for'its citizens
in regard to those matters of public necessity, convenience,
or welfare, which, on account of their peculiar character
and the difficulty or impossibility of making provision for
them otherwise are alike proper, useful, and needful for the
government to provide. Applying this rule it is held that
manufacturing, generating, selling, distributing, and supplying electricity for power for manufacturing or mechanical
purposes is not a public use for which private property may
be taken against the will of the owner. See Scudder v.

Trenton DelawareFalls Co., i N. J. Eq. 694.

FALSE IMPRISONMENT.

With two judges dissenting, the New York Supreme
Court (Appellate Division, First Department) renders a
Officers very important decision in Samuel v. -Wanao

sPCC*l

o

-maker,95 N. Y. Supp. 27 , where it is held that

defendants, at whose request one was designated as a special
officer at their store under a provision of the New York'
City Charter, providing that the public board may on application of any persons appoint a special patrolman to do
special duty at any place in the city, on the persons applying
therefor paying for his services, he to be subject to the
orders of the chief of police, and to possess all the powers
and discharge all the duties of the police force applicable to
regular patrolman, are not liable for an arrest made by him,
in the absence of anything to show that they ever authorized him to make an arrest, or that in doing so he was acting otherwise than in the exercise of the powers conferred
on him by his appointment. Compare Healey v. Lothrop,
171 Mass. 263.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

In Kreider's Estate, 212 Pa. 587, the Supreme Court of
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HUSBAND AND WIFE (Continued).

Pennsylvania decides that where a husband receives from
his wife moneys of her own separate estate which
Real Estate:

Funds of Wife

he applies with her knowledge, consent and ap-

proval to the purchase of real estate in his own
name for their joint occupancy and use, neither the wife nor
her representative after her death can recover such money
from the husband. Compare Heck's Estate, i i Mont. 66.

INJUNCTIONS.

The Court of Chancery of New Jersey holds in McCarter
v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 61 Atl. 705, that in the absence of
statute authorizing it, the Attorney General may
Suit by
Attorney-Uen.
not maintain a suit to enjoin insurers carrying
erl
out an agreenient regulating rates, though against public
policy as in' restraint of trade; and the fact that the insurers
are private corporations makes no difference. Compare
Attorney General v. Central Railroad Co., 50 N. J. Eq. 52.

INSURANCE.

It is decided by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, in Western Woolen Mill Co. v. Northern Assur. Co. of London, 139 Fed. 637, that
as used in an insurance policy,
"Fire" Defled the word "fire"
a contrary intention, is
showing
language
of
in the absence
includes the idea of
which
meaning,
to be given its ordinary
that a quantity
case
in
the
appeared
It
visible heat or light.
was subpolicies
insurance
fire
by
of wool in fleeces covered
sponcaused
which
flood,
a
merged for several days during
which
by
heat,
great
and
smoke
with
taneous combustion,
the wool was damaged and its fiber destroyed, but there was
no visible flame or glow. Under these circumstances the
court applying above rule decided that the loss was not
the result of fire, within the meaning of the policies.
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LIMITATIONS.

The Supreme Court of California decides in Glassell V.
Glassell, 82 Pac. 42, that where a will expressly enumerates
various obligations of the testator, and directs
Waiver of his executors to pay the obligations so enumerDefense
ated without reference to any law of limitations,
"which I positively repudiate and waive," such waiver of
the defense of limitations against the enumerated obligations is binding on the executors, and enforceable against
them in a suit brought by one of the enumerated creditors on
his claim.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

Against the dissent of two judges, the Supreme Court of
Washington decides in Cunningham v. City of Seattle, 82
Neglgence of
Fir' iprt-

meat

Pac. 143, that a city is not liable for the negligence of the members of its fire department in

permitting a horse used exclusively in the de-

partment to trespass on private property; the maintenance of
a fire department by a city being an exercise of a governmental function. Compare Roland v. Kalamazoo Superintendents of Poor, 49 Mich. 553.
The Court of Chancery of Delaware decides in Bancroft
v. Bancroft et al. 61 At]. 689, that a citizen and taxpayer, as
such, may not maintain a suit to enjoin improper
Improper
Use of Property use

of property conveyed to a city for a park.

Compare Biggs v. Buckingham, 6 Del. Ch. 267.

NEGLIGENCE

In Rosenblit v. Philadelphia, 28 Pa. Superior Ct., 586,
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania decides that the city
of Philadelphia which is co-terminous with the
Liability of first school district of Pennsylvania, and has
legal title to the public school buildings
therein,
is not liable in damages for injuries to a pupil in a public
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NEGLIGENCE (Continued).

school by a fall of a part of the plastering from the ceiling of
a schoolroom, although the board of education and its architect had several weeks notice of the defect in the ceiling
before the accident occurred. The ground for the city's
exemption in such a case is that the school buildings are in
actual control of the school board and board of public education, and that the city has no voice in the selection of
the officers, agents or architects of the school district, and no
power to remove them. With this decision compare Powers v. City of Philadelphia,18 Pa. Superior Ct. 621.

PERPETUITIES.

In Stone v. Forbes, 75 N. E. 141, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts decides that where a power must
Power of be exercised, if at all, by the children of the
Appointment

donee, and therefore could not be exercised

beyond the limit of the rule against perpetuities, it was not
an infringement of such rule, though an appointment might
be made under the power that would be too remote. See
Gray on the Rule Against Perpetuities,322.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

The Supreme Court of Oregon decides in Moss Mercantile Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Payette, 82 Pac. 8, that an
agent or attorney to collect and remit the amount
due on a judgment is not estopped, by reason of
Estoppel
his relationship to his principal, to assert as against the latter
that the amount due, in fact, belonged to another, and that
he paid it over to that other, on demand, prior to the commencement of suit against him by the principal. Compare
Burton v. Wilkinson, 18 Vt. 186.
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RAILROADS.

The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia holds in
Risque's Adm'r v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry Co., 51 S. E. 730,
Injury to that where a railroad company furnished defecLicensee
tive cars to the employer of plaintiff's intestate
for the use upon the employer's side track, to be loaded and
unloaded upon such side track, it was the employer's duty to
inspect the cars for defects, and the railroad company was
not liable for injuries to the plaintiff's intestate caused by
such defective cars. Compare Baltimore & Potomac R. Co.
v. Mackey 157 U. S. 72.
SALES.

In InternationalRegister Co. v. Recording Fare Register
Co., 139 Fed. 785, it appeared that defendants who had been
employees of a manufacturing company which
(ood Will:
Employees had sold its business and goodwill to complainant, found a sketch and a pattern necessary to be used in filling certain orders given to the selling company and transferred to complainant, and, with knowledge that they had
been left by an officer of the complainant through mistake,
attempted to use the same, to divert such orders to a company
formed by themselves, having knowledge of the orders
through their connection with the former company. Under
these facts the United States Circuit Court (D. Connecticut)
decides that complainant was entitled to an injunction to
restrain defendants from such use of its property to deprive
it of its contracts.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

In Smith v. Burditt, 95 N. Y. Supp. 188, the New York
Supreme Court (Appellate Division, Third Department)
decides that an oral agreement by an owner to
Debt of Anotherpay for the work and materials furnished by a
subcontractor in the construction of a building, in case
the principal contractor neglected to do so, is void within the
statute of frauds. It is further held that where, in an action
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STATUTE OF FRAUDS (Continued).

against an owner for work and labor furnished by a subcontractor, the complainant alleged that the owner promised to
pay the subcontractor if the principal contractor failed to do
so, there can be no recovery on the theory that the owner
became the principal debtor of the subcontractor. Two
judges dissent.
TRUSTS.

In re Bulwinkle, 95 N. Y. Supp. 176, it appeared that D.
deposited money in a savings bank in the name of " D., in
Without being informed thereof
Deposit In trust for L."
Bank
L. predeceased D. Thereafter D. continued to
make deposits in the account, and stated to some person that
the children of L. had money in the bank, that it was in
trust for their mother, but that they would eventually get it.
Before the death of D. the words " in trust for L." in the
bank book were obliterated. Under these facts the New
York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, Second Department) with one judge dissenting, decides that the tentative
trust came to an end with the death of L., and that there
was no trust for her children. Compare Matter of Totten,
179 N. Y.

112.

The New York Surrogate's Court, Chautauqua County,
decides In re Stevens, 95 N. Y. Supp. 297, that where shares
Capital and
Income

of a corporation were devised in trust, the in-

come to be paid to the beneficiaries, and the
corporation went out of business, and its assets were sold,
the proportionate part of the working cash capital represented by the trust estate should be retained as part of the
corpus of the estate. Compare Matterof Kernochan, 1O4 N.
Y. 618.
WILLS.

Against the dissent of six judges the Court of Errors and
Appeals of New Jersey decides in Dentarest v. Demarest, 6i
Atl. 596, that a will giving "all moneys derived
from my father's estate as my share of the same.
after my decease," to "be equally divided between my sons,"
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WILLS (Continued).

and providing that the share of one son is to be given him
"as soon as convenient after my executors receive the same,"
and the share of the other son is to be invested for him, does
not entitle the legatees to any money received by testator in
his lifetime as his share of his father's estate.

In Calkins v. Calkins, 75 N. E. 182, it appeared that after
testator had signed his will in the presence of the attesting
witnesses, the latter withdrew to another room
Attest tion outside of the range of his vision, and there
signed their names as witnesses. The witnesses then returned to the testator, and one of them read the will to him,
including the signatures, and showed the signatures to him,
and he said it was all right. Under these facts the Supreme
Court of Illinois decides that there was not a compliance with
the statute requiring the will to be attested in the presence
of the testator by two or more witnesses. Compare Mendell
v. Dunbar, 169 Mass. 74.

WITNESSES.

The Court of Appeal, Second District, of California,
decides in McRae v. Erickson, 82 Pac. 209, that a physician
in charge of a railroad hospital, whose services
Care of Patient are compensated by assessments upon the wages
of the railroad employees, acts in a professional
employment, within the rule excluding communications made
by a patient to his physician, in the course of professional
employment in examining an injured employee who is sent
to the hospital, and in eliciting information as to his injuries
on the day of examination. Interpreting the same statutory
provision it is held that all statements made by a patient to
his physician while the latter is attending the former in that
capacity for the purpose of determining his condition, are

44
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WITNESSES (Continued).

privileged, although they have nothing to do with the
patient's treatment, or the determination of his injuries, but
relate to the way in which the injuries occurred. Compare
Sloan v. New York Central R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 215.

The Supreme Court of Georgia decides in Macon Railway
& Light Co. v. Mason, 51 S. E. 569, that one who is the
Experts: graduate of a college where anatomy and physiCompetency ology are taught, and who is engaged in the
practice of osteopathy, and has gained experience in the
treatment of nervous disorders, may be examined as an
expert witness, upon these facts being made to appear, notwithstanding he is not a licensed physician and does not
administer drugs to his patients. Compare White v. Clem-

ents, 39 Ga.

232.

